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The goal of cognitive psychology is to develop and test theories about how the mind works.
In this commentary, we address the question of how fMRI can be used to help cognitive
psychologists understand cognition. We start by putting forth our own views: that fMRI can
inform theories about cognition by helping to answer at least four distinct types of questions.
Question 1: Which (if any) functions can be localized to specific brain
regions?
Coltheart (this issue) argues that, “we do not have any evidence showing that any particular
form of brain activation is a sign that some particular type of cognitive operation is being
performed” (p. XX). The degree to which the brain is composed of modules that each carry
out a specific aspect of cognition or of components that each participate in many different
processes has been hotly debated for years (for review see Kanwisher, 2010). However,
evidence indicates that some cortical regions respond selectively to certain categories of
visual stimuli (for instance, the fusiform face area, the parahippocampal place area and the
extrastriate body area; Downing, Chan, Peelen, Dodds, & Kanwisher, 2006). This category
selectivity bears directly on one of the basic tasks of cognitive psychology, which is to come
up with an inventory of dissociable mental processes. Thus, the finding that a given cortical
region is selectively engaged in a particular mental process can be informative not because it
tells us the location of that process (why would a psychologist care?), but because it
suggests that the brain, and hence the mind, contains specialized mechanisms for that
particular mental process. As reviewed below, localization findings have also been used in
many creative ways to test other hypotheses about cognition.
Question 2: Can markers of mental process X be found during task Y?
From the perspective of some cognitive psychologists, the focus of initial fMRI research on
localization did not appear to provide information about how the mind worked (for a review
see Shimamura, 2010). For instance, Uttal (2001) argues that, “Even if we could associate
precisely defined cognitive functions in particular areas of the brain (and this seems highly
unlikely), it would tell us very little if anything about how the brain computes, represents,
encodes, or instantiates psychological processes (Uttal, 2001, p. 217).
But to say that neuroimaging answers only “where” questions is to confuse the superficial
format of raw neuroimaging data with the content of the questions those data can answer;
Neuroimagers collecting fMRI data need no more restrict themselves to “where” questions
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than cognitive psychologists measuring reaction times need limit themselves to “when”
questions.
Indeed, looking back over the past two decades of work using fMRI, one can see that an
initial focus on “brain mapping” provided a critical foundation for the field that allowed it to
go beyond “where” questions to address “how” questions. To the extent that highly
specialized brain regions are discovered, and their functional specialization well
established1, activity in these regions can serve as markers for specific cognitive functions,
enabling us to ask whether and to what extent mental process X is engaged in task Y. For
example, by showing people a series of scenes and faces and asking them to remember one
type of stimuli and ignore the other during a retention interval, researchers tested the
hypothesis that people suppress mental representations of distracting to-be-ignored stimuli
(Gazzaley, Cooney, McEvoy, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2005) and that older adults show less
suppression of the distracting stimuli (Gazzaley, Cooney, Rissman, & D’Esposito, 2005). In
this study, activity in the fusiform face area (for faces) or parahippocampal place area (for
scenes) was used as a signal of enhancement or suppression of processing that type of
stimuli.
Another example comes from work testing the hypothesis that objects are the units of
attentional selection, rather than locations or features (O’Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher,
1999). Here, each stimulus in a sequence consisted of a face transparently superimposed on
a house, with either the face or the house moving. Participants had to monitor either
repetitions in faces or houses or the direction of motion. Attending to one attribute of an
object (e.g., the motion of a house) enhanced activity not only in the region specialized for
that attribute (e.g., area MT/MST for motion) but also in the region specialized for its other
attribute (e.g., the parahippocampal place area for houses) compared against the other
object’s attributes. These results provide evidence for object-based attention and argue
against locations or features being the unit of selection.
Question 3: How distinct are the representations of different stimuli or
tasks?
One of the central tasks of cognitive psychology is to characterize mental representations.
The crux of the characterization of a mental representation is the specification of its
invariant and equivalence classes: which entities does it take to be the same, and which
different? A representation common to two different viewpoints of an object is an invariant
representation of object shape, whereas a representation that is common to the word “dog”
and a picture of a dog is an abstract semantic representation. This is the fundamental logic
behind priming methods in cognitive psychology and looking time methods in cognitive
development research. fMRI has two methods that follow the same basic logic, enabling us
to characterize neural representations in particular brain regions by asking which stimuli are
treated as different and which the same: fMRI adaptation (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001)
and fMRI multivariate pattern analysis (Haxby, 2012; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby,
2006).
Multivariate pattern analysis is sensitive enough to decode differences in the visual stimuli
being viewed, such as the orientation of a striped pattern (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani &
Tong, 2005), the movement direction in a field of dots (Kamitani & Tong, 2006), the
semantic category of a word (Mitchell et al., 2004), the category of object (e.g., animals,
1Poldrack has correctly criticized “reverse inference”, in which mental processes are inferred from the location of fMRI responses
(Poldrack, 2006). Note however that for the few cases of brain regions whose functions are very specific, and for which that
specificity is widely replicated, these regions can indeed support solid reverse inferences.
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cars, planes), and in some cases even the exemplar of a category (e.g., cows, frogs, turtles)
(Cichy, Chen, & Haynes, 2011). For instance, representations of scenes in the PPA (Epstein
& Kanwisher, 1998) have been shown to encode the layout of space in a scene (Kravitz,
Peng, & Baker, 2011; Park, 2011 #7414, and to generalize across photographs and line
drawings of scenes, Walther, Chai, Caddigan, Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2011), whereas
representations in early visual cortex encode distance, and neither encode conceptual/
semantic information about scenes (Kravitz et al., 2011). In contrast, lateral occipital cortex
encodes information about the content of scenes, such as whether it is an urban or natural
setting (Park, Brady, Greene, & Oliva, 2011).
Probing these types of representations can also address theoretical questions about the
structure of cognitive processes. For instance, one study tested the hypothesis that
information in working memory is maintained by the same sensory regions that process
those stimuli when they are first perceived (Serences, Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 2009). This
study showed participants colored grating patterns and asked them to either remember the
color or the grating orientation over a 10-second delay. When participants were trying to
remember the color, multivariate pattern analyses were able to classify the color but not the
orientation of the stimulus being maintained based on activity in primary visual cortex
during the delay period. In contrast, when participants were trying to remember the
orientation, orientation but not color could be classified. These results suggest that the
sustained stimulus-specific patterns in primary visual cortex reflect active maintenance in
working memory. These and other fMRI data challenge models that assume that working
memory requires dedicated buffers or storage sites (for a review see D’Esposito, 2007).
Question 4: Do two tasks X and Y engage common or distinct processing
mechanisms?
A fourth way that fMRI can inform cognition does not require any commitment to or prior
finding of strong functional specificity of a particular region of the brain. Specifically, fMRI
provides a natural way to ask one of the classic questions of cognitive psychology: do two
tasks X and Y engage common or distinct processing mechanisms? If conducted properly,
experiments showing overlapping brain activation for the two tasks, with appropriate control
conditions, within individual subjects, can provide evidence for common mechanisms. For
example one study found common brain regions engaged across diverse forms of visual
attention (Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999), arguing that these diverse attentional phenomena
have more in common than their name. Conversely, other studies have shown that distinct
mechanisms are engaged in high-level language processing but not in deductive logic
(Monti, Parsons, & Osherson, 2009), algebra (Monti, Parsons, & Osherson, 2012), or other
cognitive phenomena including music (Fedorenko, Behr, & Kanwisher, 2011; Fedorenko,
McDermott, Norman-Haignere, & Kanwisher, in press) – demonstrating powerful
dissociations between language and (many aspects of) thought. Another example comes
from studies testing the hypothesis that there is a unified attentional bottleneck involved in
both perception and decision-making (Jiang & Kanwisher, 2003; Tombu et al., 2011). These
studies found that the same brain regions showed “bottleneck” properties during a
perceptual encoding task and during a speeded response decision task; these findings are
inconsistent with task switching accounts that posit independent substrates for encoding and
response selection.
Another question that has been tackled by examining the similarity of brain activation
patterns across two conditions is whether honesty results from the absence of temptation or
from the active resistance of temptation. Individuals given the opportunity to cheat who
were honest showed no greater activity in brain regions associated with behavior control
than those who were in a control condition with no opportunity to cheat (or any differences
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in activity in any other brain regions, even at a low threshold), whereas those who were
dishonest showed significantly more activity in brain regions associated with cognitive
control (Greene & Paxton, 2009). The similarity of brain activation patterns among those
who were honest and those with no opportunity to cheat argues against the hypothesis that
honesty results from the active resistance of temptation—at least in the context of the task
used in that study.
The observation that two tasks that have been thought of as distinct engage common
processing mechanisms can also generate new theoretical predictions. For instance, fMRI
research that directly compared imagining the future to remembering the past has revealed
that these processes engages the same neural networks (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter
& Addis, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). This surprising finding led to the
novel hypothesis that older adults, who have impaired function in the neural networks
involved in remembering past events, should also show impairments in mentally simulating
the future. Subsequent research revealed that, indeed, older adults generate fewer distinct
details when simulating the future and that this deficit is correlated with their relational
memory abilities and with how many distinct details they generate when remembering the
past (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008).
How effectively has fMRI contributed to cognitive theory?
So far, we have outlined four ways in which fMRI provides tools that can be used to address
theoretical debates about cognition. But how effectively have these tools been used? As
mentioned by Coltheart in this issue, a survey of fMRI studies investigating cognitive
functions published between 2007 and 2011 in eight journals found that most (89%) of the
studies aimed to localize cognitive processes while 11% aimed to test a theory of cognition
(Tressoldi, Sella, Coltheart, & Umilta, 2012). Of those that aimed to test a cognitive theory,
Tressoldi et al. argued that around half committed the “consistency fallacy” (Mole & Klein,
2010), as these studies apparently claimed that their study supports some theory because the
data from that study are consistent with the theory without also providing evidence that the
study could have yielded a pattern of data that would have opposed that theory. Based on
these metrics, only a small set of fMRI studies of cognition test cognitive theories.
Does this low hit rate mean that fMRI has properties that make it less likely to be able to
inform cognitive theories than behavioral data? For instance, Uttal (2001, p. 206) argues that
behaviorism approaches are better suited for the study of psychological processes than
neuroimaging approaches; “One other general goal of this book has been to champion the
resurrection of an underappreciated, yet scientifically sounder, approach to the study of
psychological processes—behaviorism.” So how does the “cognitive theory” track record of
fMRI stack up against that of behavioral methods? Although, to our knowledge, no one has
attempted this type of comparison, the case can be made that resolving controversies
between theories in cognitive psychology is surprisingly difficult regardless of the methods
used (Greenwald, 2012). Of 13 examples of prominent controversies in cognitive and social
psychology originating in the 1950’s through the early 1980’s reviewed by Greenwald, only
one—whether mental rotation required visual representation or not—was clearly resolved.
Interestingly, it was not resolved by behavioral methods but by neuroimaging (Ganis,
Keenan, Kosslyn, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Kosslyn, Digirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert,
1998).
What is needed for fMRI research to inform cognitive theory?
In this issue, Wixted and Mickes state that “fMRI can inform cognitive theories that make
predictions about patterns of activity in the brain” (p. XX). The implication, as made explicit
by Coltheart, is that cognitive theories that do not make predictions about the results of
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functional neuroimaging experiments cannot be informed by the results of neuroimaging
experiments. We argue that, to the contrary, results from fMRI studies can be used to help
resolve theoretical debates about cognition even when the theories involved make no
predictions about the brain regions involved. An example described above is the fMRI study
testing the hypothesis that objects are the units of attentional selection, rather than locations
or features (O’Craven et al., 1999). In that study, the fMRI results were able to distinguish
between processing of two different objects superimposed in the same location and their
features (in this case, motion). The specific brain regions involved in processing each type
of object and the motion were not relevant for testing the theory – but knowledge about
these regions allowed the researchers to decode which type of information was being
processed. As in this example, researchers have been using the decoding aspects of fMRI in
many creative ways to test research questions that themselves have little direct connection to
the brain. For instance, do older adults show more impairment in reflective selective
attention than in perceptual selective attention (Mitchell, Johnson, Higgins, & Johnson,
2010)? Does a deficit in processing multiple stimuli at once contribute to older adults’
binding deficits (Chee et al., 2006)?
Coltheart argues that cognitive systems need to be defined first before neuroimaging data are
collected, hence that neuroimaging is only informed by, rather than informing, cognition.
However, rarely does or should any area of science lock in its definitions, then just collect
data while insisting that those definitions remain rigidly fixed in place. Rather, interesting
experimental work alters our understanding of the very phenomena we set out to explore.
Coltheart’s argument says not that cognition cannot be informed by the brain, but rather that
it should not allow itself to be. But why not let our ideas about cognition be shaped in part
by neuroimaging data? For instance, as described above, having discovered that imagining
the future activates the same neural networks as remembering the past, researchers who
knew that those neural networks were impaired in older adults were able to generate a new
prediction about behavior—and indeed demonstrated that older adults imagine the future
less vividly than younger adults do (Addis et al., 2008).
In sum, we disagree with Coltheart that imaging can only inform cognitive theories when we
can assume that “cognitive process C is implemented in brain region X and nowhere else in
the brain, and brain region X subserves cognitive process C and no other process” (p. XX).
Instead, as outlined above, there are many ways that imaging can inform cognition without
meeting this high bar.
The importance of having cognitive theories inform neuroimaging research
We began by acknowledging the goal of cognitive psychology as developing and testing
theories about how the mind works. This is not the only worthwhile goal, however. With the
advent of neuroimaging techniques, cognitive psychologists (and psychological scientists
more generally) have also begun to advance the goal of developing and testing theories
about how the brain works (Cacioppo & Decety, 2009). As evidence, Wixted and Mickes
(this issue) note that many fMRI studies rely on a cognitive theory to interpret their results,
even when they are not testing the theory. Psychological theory is critically important to
understanding the human brain and also in designing experiments that differentiate different
cognitive processes. Given the complexity of the human brain, progress in understanding its
functional organization and structure depends on sophisticated theoretical specifications of
the psychological representations and processes that differentiate two or more comparison
conditions. Psychological scientists, therefore, are well positioned to lead the search for
brain mechanisms underlying psychological processes. Doing so constitutes an expansion of
the purview of psychological science beyond a science of behavior, beyond a science of the
mind, to include a science of the brain (Cacioppo & Decety, 2009).
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In the 20 years since the first publication using fMRI, there has been an explosion of interest
in this method and many have employed it to investigate questions about cognition. In this
commentary, we outlined four ways in which we believe that fMRI results can inform our
understanding of cognition. First, it can answer questions about which functions can be
localized to specific brain regions, questions that are of critical interest for those examining
issues related to the modularity of the brain (e.g., Blumstein, Cabeza & Moscovitch, Chiao
& Immordino-Yang). Second, fMRI data can be used as markers of particular mental
processes, allowing insight into what processes are being engaged during different tasks.
Third, fMRI can answer questions about exactly what information is represented in each
region of the brain. Such data can be used to address theoretical questions about the nature
of memory reactivation (e.g., Levy & Wagner) and working memory (e.g., Reuter-Lorenz)
as well as basic questions about the structure of cognitive processes (e.g., Serences et al.,
2009). Fourth, fMRI can answer questions about whether two tasks engage common or
distinct processing mechanisms. This strategy can provide important evidence to address
theoretical questions about the nature of tasks (e.g., Rugg & Thompson-Schill) and how
functional circuitry reorganizes with age (e.g., Park & McDonough).
Of course, powerful as it is, fMRI is impotent to answer some questions. First, fMRI can
never address the causal role of a particular brain region in a particular task, though showing
correlations between fMRI signals and behavior help somewhat. Definitive answers to
questions of causal role thus require other methods such as transcranial magnetic
stimulation, electrical brain stimulation, and studies of patients with brain damage. Second,
fMRI for the most port does not have the necessary temporal resolution to reveal the
workings of thought, the component stages of which generally proceed on the scale of tens
or hundreds of milliseconds, not seconds. Precise timing information from the human brain
is available from ERP and MEG, intracranial recordings, and TMS. Third, even with high-
resolution fMRI and even with sophisticated pattern analysis methods, each voxel pools
neural activity over hundreds of thousands of neurons, so the signal we can see with fMRI is
a drastically subsampled version of the actual language in which neurons talk to each other.
This means that we cannot tell whether the same neurons are involved even when activity
looks the same across multiple conditions. Finally, like other neuroscience methods, even
the most astonishing demonstration of a specific neural representation in a given region of
the brain leaves open the question of whether that representation was computed locally in
the region where it is observed, or whether instead that information was inherited from an
earlier stage of processing. The best approach to answering questions about cognition
therefore is a synergistic combination of behavioral and neuroimaging methods, richly
complemented by the wide array of other methods in cognitive neuroscience.
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